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ABSTRACT
This study addresses the linkages between lending structure and bank risk exposures via the Capital Asset Pricing
Model (CAPM). Based on the 3-factor CAPM, five risk measures are examined; namely, the market, interest rate,
exchange rate, total and unsystematic risk exposure. The influence of lending structure is analysed via four measures,
the real estate lending, the specialisation index, the short-term lending stability, and the medium-term lending
stability. Our findings show that the lending structure affects the market, interest rate, and unsystematic risk exposures.
The stability of lending structure in both the short-term and medium-term period positively influence the market and
interest rate risk exposure. On the other hand, the medium-term lending structure stability negatively affects the
unsystematic risk exposure. Thus, the policy makers, bankers, and investors should not ignore the significant role of
the lending structure when developing a strategic risk management framework.
ABSTRAK
Kajian ini melihat hubungan antara struktur pinjaman dengan risiko bank menggunakan pendekatan Model
Peletakan Harga Aset Modal (CAPM). Berdasarkan 3-faktor CAPM, lima jenis risiko telah dikaji; iaitu, risiko pasaran,
risiko kadar faedah, risiko kadar tukaran asing, risiko sistematik dan risiko keseluruhan. Kesan pengaruh struktur
pinjaman terhadap risiko dikaji menggunakan empat ukuran, iaitu pinjaman kepada sektor hartanah, indeks
konsentrasi, kestabilan struktur pinjaman bagi jangka pendek dan kestabilan struktur pinjaman bagi jangka masa
sederhana. Hasil kajian mendapati bahawa struktur pinjaman mempengaruhi risiko pasaran, risiko kadar faedah
dan risiko sistematik. Kestabilan struktur pinjaman bagi jangka pendek dan jangka sederhana mempengaruhi risiko
pasaran dan risiko kadar faedah secara positif. Manakala, kestabilan struktur pinjaman jangka sederhana
mempengaruhi risiko sistematik secara songsang. Oleh itu, para penggubal polisi, pengurus sektor perbankan dan
pelabur seharusnya mengambil kira kepentingan peranan struktur pinjaman dalam membangunkan kerangka
strategik bagi pengurusan risiko bank.
INTRODUCTION
The 1997 ASEAN financial crisis, followed by the oil crisis,
the U.S subprime crisis, and the ongoing world economic
crisis have stimulated research to focus on the risk
exposures. While the scope of risk exposure is vast, most
studies center on the risk of the market, interest rate and
exchange rate. Besides this, the rapid financial
liberalisation, the systematic and unsystematic risk
exposures have also been of great concern to many
researchers. Hence, the aim of this study is to investigate
the impact of the lending structure on the five
aforementioned risk exposures using the 3-factor CAPM.
Why the lending structure? The issue of the lending
structure becomes popular since Hanson, Pesaran, and
Schuermann (2008) have theoretically proven that there
will be further scope for risk diversification if the banking
activities come from different sectors, even in the case of
a sufficiently large portfolio. In fact, Blasko and Sinkey Jr.
(2006) empirically show that concentration in mortgage
lending challenges the capability of the U.S. banks to
manage the risk of interest rate. With regards to the
Malaysian context, Nor Hayati and M. Ariff (2004) provide
empirical evidence that lending to risky sectors can
negatively affect the market risk exposure of the
depository institutions. Interestingly, by separately
testing a set of similar variables to depository institutions
and commercial banks, Madura, Martin, & Taylor (1994)
show inconsistent results. As no studies have been
conducted for the commercial banks in Malaysia, this
study tries to fulfill the gap in this area. Besides this, the
lending structure models developed in this study may
have some implications concerning the risk exposure that
has been ignored in previous research. Prior research
addresses either the real estate lending or lending
specialisation. However, this study analyses the stability
issue of lending structure in both the short and medium-
term period besides the two ordinary measures. This study
investigates the stability effect of lending structure. The
stability models is adopted from Mansor and Ruzita
(2004), Amin Gutierrez de Pineres and Ferrantino (1997,
1999) who examine the stability of export structure. With
this background in mind, the novelty of this study can be
addressed in at least three ways: by focusing on 1) the
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3-factor CAPM risk measures, 2) the four different lending
structure models, and finally 3) the Malaysian commercial
banks.
LITERATURE  REVIEW
There are enormous empirical studies on bank risk
exposures. While Madura et al. (1994) and Nor Hayati
and M. Ariff (2004) examine the determinants of risk
exposure per se, Saunders, Strock, and Travlos (1990),
Anderson and Fraser (2000), Konishi and Yasuda (2004),
Hassan (1993), Cebeyonan and Strahan (2004),
Gallo, Apilado and Kolari (1996), Gonzales (2004), Marco
and Fernandez (2008), Lepetit, Nys, Rous and Tarazi (2008)
and Yong, Faff and Chalmers (2009) investigate various
issues of bank risk exposure either for a single-country or
single-region study.
Madura et al. (1994) studied the determinants of the
ex-ante risk for the depository institutions and commercial
banks in the United States. The ex-ante risk measure is
implied based on call option price. Their findings show
that the ex-ante risk of depository institutions and
commercial banks have different determinants,
conjecturing that both institutions cannot be treated
similarly. Lending structure and real estate owned are the
determinants for the depository institutions; while real
estate owned and capital buffer are the determinants for
the commercial banks. In the case of Malaysia, Nor Hayati
and M. Ariff (2004) investigated the determinants of
market, total and unsystematic risk exposures based on
the single-factor CAPM. Unlike Madura et al. (1994), they
only focus on the depository institutions. In Nor Hayati
and M. Ariff (2004), the depository institutions comprise
the commercial banks, merchant banks and finance
companies. Their findings show that the three types of
risk exposures have different determinants. The
determinants for market risk exposure are loan quality,
cost of fund, loan expansion, and lending structure. For
the unsystematic and total risk exposure, the determinants
are loan quality, cost of fund, and interest rate, with loan
expansion being an additional variable for total risk
exposure.
Saunders et al. (1990) considered three BSV related
to capital buffer, operating cost, and size when they
examine the impact of ownership structure on the U.S.
bank risk exposures based on the 2-factor CAPM. The risk
measures are: 1) total risk; 2) unsystematic risk for short-
term interest rate; 3) unsystematic risk for long- term
interest rate; 4) market risk for short-term interest rate;
5) market risk for long-term interest rate; 6) short-term
interest rate, and 7) long-term interest rate risk exposure.
The independent variables are:1) Ownership structure:
proportion of stock held by managers; 2) Financial
Leverage: Capital/TA; 3) Operating Leverage: FA/TA;
4) Size: TA. Their findings show that size is positively
related to market risk but negatively related to interest
rate risk. The underlying reason for the conflicting signs
is that larger banks tend to be sensitive to market
movement, but at the same time are more able to diversify
their interest rate risk exposure. In a similar study,
Anderson and Fraser (2000) examined the single-factor
CAPM risk and include an additional BSV, frequency. They
argue that frequency (the ratio of an average daily share
volume traded to number of shares outstanding)
represents the level of business risk exposure since it
denotes the speed of which new info is captured in stock
price and correlated to variances in bank balance sheet
and off-balance sheet portfolio. Their findings show that
size is negatively related to total risk, but positively related
to systematic risk. Furthermore, frequency is positively
related to both total and systematic risks. Whilst Saunders
et al. (1990) and Anderson and Fraser (2000) analyzed for
the case of U.S., Konishi and Yasuda (2004) and Marco
and Fernandez (2008) examined a comparable study for
the case of Japan and Spanish, respectively. Their studies
add value to the existing gap in the literature in terms of
the risk measurements. Konishi and Yasuda (2004) analyse
CAPM and insolvency risk while Marco and Fernandez
(2008) only focus on the insolvency risk exposure. The
2-factor CAPM risk exposure are:1)Total risk,
2)Unsystematic risk for short-term interest rate, 3)
Unsystematic risk for long-term interest rate, 4) market
risk exposure for short-term interest rate, 5)market risk
exposure for long- term interest rate, 6) systematic risk
exposure for short-term interest rate, 7)systematic risk
exposure for long- term interest rate. The insolvency risk
exposure is the Zrisk index. While Konishi and Yasuda
(2004) reveal that size and capital buffer are significantly
related to the 2-factor CAPM and insolvency risk exposures,
Marco and Fernandez (2008) show that size, profitability,
and business types are significantly related to the
insolvency risk exposure.
Hassan (1993) and Cebenoyan and Strahan (2004)
conducted a study on the impact of loan sales on bank
risk exposures for the U.S. They analyse seven BSV
comprising loan expansion, loan quality, loan structure,
GAP analysis, size, capital buffer, and short-term
investment securities. While the former estimates risk
based on the single-factor CAPM and the subordinated
debt models, the later measures risk based on the financial
ratios. Hassan (1993)’s findings reveal that lending
specialisation and loan expansion are positively related
to all types of risk measures; whereas GAP analysis and
size produce mixed results. On the other hand, Cebenoyan
and Strahan (2004) discover that capital buffer and short-
term investment securities are inversely related while loan
expansion is positively related to the financial ratio’s risk
exposures.
Gallo et al. (1996) consider loan expansion, capital
buffer, short-term investment securities and size as BSV
when examining the impact of mutual fund investments
on bank risk exposure in the U.S. They estimate that the
market and industry risk exposures using the single-factor
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CAPM have two types of risk with different determinants.
Loan expansion is inversely related to the market risk
exposure; whereas loan expansion, short-term investment
securities, and mutual fund activities are inversely related
to the industry risk exposure.
Lepetit et al. (2008) analysed the impact of income
structure on the European banks risk exposure by looking
at aspects comprising size, capital buffer, profitability, loan
expansion, and cost of fund as BSV. Based on the single-
factor CAPM and insolvency risk estimations, they find
that size and capital buffer are the significant variables.
Finally, Yong et al. (2009) studied the impact of derivative
activities on ten Asia-Pacific countries whereby loan
expansion, loan quality, size, capital buffer, short-term
investment securities, profitability ratio, and non-interest
income as the BSV are considered. They are able to
estimate the short-term interest rate, long-term interest
rate and exchange rate risk exposures with the use of the
4-factor CAPM. They find that loan expansion is significant
to long-term interest rate risk whereas short-term
investment securities and loan expansion are significant
to short-term interest rate risk exposure. Correspondingly,
size, short-term investment securities and loan expansion
are significant to exchange rate risk exposure.
DATA  AND  METHODOLOGY
We adopt the generalised least squares (GLS) unbalanced
panel regression estimations to analyse the impact of
lending structure on the 3-factor CAPM risk exposures.
Three models are tested; namely the ‘pooled effect’, fixed
effect, and random effect model. The best model is selected
based on the Likelihood Ratio and Hausman test. To cater
for the heteroskedasticity issue, this study incorporates
the cross-section weight in the GLS estimation. According
to Shahida (2006) and Roza Hazli (2007), the first-order
autocorrelation problem is tackled based on the Park’s
model. This study comprises all eleven listed bank holding
companies in Malaysia for year 1994-2006. It ends in the
year 2006 because 2007 onwards has witnessed volatile
economic developments such as the food crisis, oil price
crisis, and the U.S. prime crisis which may indirectly affect
our regression analysis. Our research design is expressed
as below:
Risk = f (LS, BSV)  [Equation 1]
Where the five alternative risk measures are: market,
interest rate, exchange rate, total and unsystematic risk
exposures. The four alternative lending structure (LS)
variables are: real estate lending, specialisation index
(SPEC), lending composition change (LCC), and variance
of traditionality index (VART). Our BSV are TL, LS, PLL, TE,
GAP, INTEXP, INV, LTA, NONII, and MGT. The detailed
specifications for the 3-factor CAPM risk, lending structure,
and the BSV are as in Table 1, 2, and 3, respectively.
The expected coefficient signs for the BSV follow the
justification from previous studies. With regards to loan
expansion, Hassan (1993), Madura et al. (1994), Gallo
et al. (1996) suggest that the illiquidity of loans and default
issues are the underlying reasons for the positive
TABLE 1. Specification for 3-factor CAPM risk exposures
Variable
Market risk
exposure
Interest rate
risk exposure
Exchange rate
risk exposure
Unsystematic
risk exposure
Total risk
exposure
Mnemonic
βm
βi
βforex
standard deviation
of εt
standard deviation
of Rt
Note: The three-factor CAPM risk measures are based on the single-factor CAPM, initially developed by Sharpe (1964). Sharpe (1964)
finds that the sensitivity to stock market can determine the expected return of an asset. However, his assumption that asset pricing
depends on a stock market return in explaining the risks inherent in the assets does not hold. Arbitrage Pricing Theory proposed by
Ross (1976) suggests that multiple factors affect the expected return of an asset. In the financial sector, the importance of the
interest rate leads to the establishment of two-factor CAPM as in Stone (1974), Martin and Keown (1977), Booth and Officer
(1985), Flannery and James (1984), Chance and Lane (1980), Lynge and Zumwalt (1980), Jahankhani and Lynge (1980), Bae
(1990), and Llyod and Shick (1997). Further, recent studies proposed a three-factor CAPM in pricing the financial institutions.
Chamberlain et al. (1997) and Hahm (2004) highlight the significance of exchange rate as the third factor. The risk-return
relationship of the three-factor CAPM employed in this study is expressed as: Rt = ± + ²m (Rmt) + ²i (Rit) + ²forex (Rforext) + µt where Rmt
= daily market return of KLCI for one year; Rit =daily interest rate changes of MGS-10 years for one year;; Rforext = daily nominal
effective exchange rate changes for one year. After five types of risk exposures are estimated based on yearly basis for all eleven
bank holding companies, GLS unbalanced panel regression estimation is conducted based on [Equation 1].
Measured as
Beta coefficient measuring the sensitivity of bank portfolio return to daily market return of
Kuala Lumpur Composite Index (KLCI) during a one year period.
Beta coefficient measuring the sensitivity of bank portfolio return to daily interest rate
changes of 10 year -Malaysian Government securities (MGS) during a one year period.
Beta coefficient measuring the sensitivity of bank portfolio return to daily nominal effective
exchange rate (NEER) changes during a one year period.
The standard deviation of the error term which captures all other factors that affect bank
return that are not taken into account explicitly during a one year period.
The standard deviation of the return of bank holding companies (BHCs) during a one year
period.
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TABLE 3. Specification for BSV
      Independent Variable                                     Measured as Mnemonic Expected
Coefficient sign
Credit Related Variables:
Loan expansion Ratio of total loan to total asset TL +
Loan quality Ratio of provision for loan loss to total asset PLL +
Capital Related Variables:
Capital buffer Ratio of total equity to total asset TE -
Interest Rate Related Variables:
GAP analysis Absolute value of the ratio of (total market sensitive assets GAP +
- total market sensitive liabilities) to total asset
Cost of fund Ratio of interest expense to total asset INTEXP +
Liquidity Related Variable:
Liquid Asset Ratio of short term investment securities to total asset INV -
Business Related Variables:
Size Logarithm of total asset LTA +/-
Deviation from traditional Ratio of non-interest income to total asset NONII -
role of banking
Management efficiency Ratio of earning asset to total asset MGT +/-
TABLE 2. Specification for lending structure variables
Mnemonic
RE
BPS
RISKY
LCC
SPEC
VART
( )12 1
1
min ,it it
i
LCC s s
−
=
= ∑
12
2
1
it
i
SPEC s
=
= ∑
2
, 12
5
l
i tl
it
c
TI
=
−
=−
=
∑
0
1
0
t
iti t
it t
itt t
e
C
e
=
=
=
∑
∑
Measured as
• Real estate sector per se is loan given to real estate sector, which comprise residential, non-
residential, real estate properties. (Madura et al. (1994) and Blasko & Sinkey Jr. (2006))
• Broad property sector comprises of RE and construction sector. (Roza Hazli (2007))
• Risky sector comprises loan given to BPS, purchase of securities and consumption credit.
(Nor Hayati & M. Ariff (2004)) All three measures are ratios to total loan.
where sit is the share of sector i in total lending in year t. It takes on a maximum value of 1 if there
is no change in lending composition and a minimum value of 0 if the portfolio of lending by sector
loan was not loaned in the previous year. Thus, a high value of LCC suggests short-run stability of
lending composition.
where, si is the lending share of industry i in total lending. A score approaching 1 suggest a high
degree of loan concentration while a score approaching 0 indicates a high degree of diversification
It is a variance of traditionality index (TI), calculated using five-year intervals for each sector. The
TI for the year 1995 is computed using data from 1993 to 1997; for 1996, using data from 1994-
1998, and so on. The TI formula is as follows:
where, the cumulative lending experience (Cit) for each industry is calculated as:
where t0 and t1 are initial and terminal periods of the data and eit is lending of industry i in year t.
Since VART is a variance of TI across sector, a high variance indicates an episode of divergent
pattern, and vice versa.
Variable
Real estate
lending
Stability in
lending
composition in
the short- run
Specialized
index
Stability of
lending
composition
over an
intermediate
term
0
1
0
t
iti t
it t
itt t
e
C
e
=
=
=
∑
∑
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relationship between TL and risk. In contrast, when
discussing loan default, earlier studies hypothesize that
PLL represents the probability of future default (bad loan
quality). Thus, it is expected to be positively related to
risk. For the case of capital buffer, equity is perceived to
provide cushion against loss; hence, increasing TE
reduces the risk exposure. For the GAP analysis, a positive
GAP indicates that a particular bank is an asset sensitive
bank while a negative GAP indicates that it is a liability
sensitive bank.
A positive GAP bank (or an asset sensitive bank) is
exposed to risk that interest rate will fall whereas a negative
GAP bank (or a liability bank) is exposed to risk that interest
rate will increase. Thus, the greater the absolute value of
GAP, the more the bank is exposed to changes in interest
rate. Despite the GAP analysis, Madura et al. (1994) argue
that bank risk depends on the proportion of funds
obtained in the deposit account (measured by interest
expense), which is not captured in the GAP analysis. They
hypothesize that the higher the deposit, the higher the
interest expense, the higher the volatility of net interest
income, the riskier is the bank. For the case of INV, risk is
linked to it from the perspective of deposit withdrawal.
Having cash idle is an opportunity cost to banks, but
banks hold short-term investment securities to standby
the need for extraordinary deposit withdrawal. With
regards to size, Saunders et al. (1990) and Hassan (1993)
argue that the greater the size, the greater the potential
will be to diversify business risk and adjust unexpected
liquidity and capital shortfall, thus reducing the bank risk
exposure. However, Anderson and Fraser (2000) suggest
that the impact of size on risk depends on the lending
structure. If the loan composition is the same, bigger banks
should have lower risk as compared to smaller banks.
Nonetheless, if the loan structure is different, a bigger
bank can have higher risk exposure than the smaller one
due to its tendency to embark into riskier lending sector
that can give higher return. Similarly, Gonzales (2004)
mentions that with the existence of the economy of scale,
increase market power, and the ‘too big to fail’ policy for
big banks, a bigger bank tends to enter into risky activities
either through lending strategy or off-balance sheet
activities. Against this background, size can be positively
or inversely related to risk exposure. For the case of non-
financing activities, Madura et al. (1994) offer evidence
that diversifying from the traditional role banking (lending)
reduces bank risk. Finally, with regards to management
efficiency, Angbazo (1997), Nor Hayati and M. Ariff (2004),
and Aisyah, Mansor, and Ahamed Kameel (2008, 2009)
suggest that management efficiency can influence bank
risk exposure. Negative association of MGT infers an
efficient management, and vice versa. They believe that
investing in earning assets is risky as it is exposed to
market, interest rate and exchange rate fluctuations. Thus,
if an increase in earning asset is associated to a decrease
in risk exposure, it can be implied that the bank
management is efficient.
FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION
Table 4 presents the descriptive statistics whereby Figure
1 plots the trend movements of lending structure and 3-
factor CAPM risk exposures. For the trend of lending
structure, despite a decrease in 1995 and 2005, the real
estate lending (BPS, RE, RISKY) show an upward trend.
With regards to LCC, the low value in 1996 and 2005 is the
result of the consolidation program and the change of
reporting style, respectively. Instead of categorising loan
by sectors, they are now categorising it by the economic
purpose. Loan by sector: 1) agriculture, hunting, forestry
and fishing; 2) mining and quarrying; 3) manufacturing;
4) electricity, gas and water; 5) broad property sectors; 6)
wholesale, retail trade, restaurants and hotels; 7) transport,
storage and communication; 8) finance, insurance and
business services; 9) purchase of securities; 10) purchase
of transport vehicles; 11) consumption credit; and 12)
others. Meanwhile, loan by economic purpose: 1)
agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing; 2) mining and
quarrying; 3) manufacturing; 4) electricity, gas and water;
5) broad property sectors; 6) wholesale, retail trade,
restaurants and hotels; 7) transport, storage and
communication; 8) finance, insurance and business
services; 9) purchase of securities; 10) purchase of
transport vehicles; 11) consumption credit; 12)
community, social, and personal services; 13) general
commerce; and 14) others. For SPEC, the trend is similar to
a U-shape. Since 1996, it shows a diversified lending
portfolio for quite some time before it starts to become
specialised in 2004 onwards. Finally, VART shows a
divergent pattern of lending structure.
For the trend of the CAPM risk measure, the market
risk exposure shows a volatile pattern, ranging from 1.2
to 0.9 from year 1994 to 2006. For the short-term interest
rate risk exposure, the trend movement is rather stagnant,
except for the year 2001 onwards. In contrast, the long-
term interest rate risk exposure appears to be volatile.
Interestingly, the short and long-term interest rate risk
exposures show an inconsistent trend from year 2001
onwards. While the short-term rate exhibits a stable trend
before it drops to the lowest point in 2003, the long-term
rate shows an upward trend after going through the
weakest point in 2001.
As for the case of exchange rate risk exposure, there
is a volatile pattern. Starting from year 1995, it shows an
increasing trend and achieves its highest point in 2000.
The desired effect of the fixed exchange rate policy in
1997 does not seem to be instantly achieved as the
exchange rate risk exposure keeps on increasing until year
2000. This can be due to a stronger negative effect of the
1998 financial crisis on exchange rate risk exposure.
Nonetheless, there was a need for a pegging policy when
the exchange rate risk exposure decreased to its lowest
point in 2002. Unfortunately, it is not long lasting when
the government announced a managed floating exchange
rate policy in 2005.
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TABLE 4. Descriptive statistics
Variables Mnemonic Mean Std.. dev
Market Risk Exposure 1.08 0.40
Interest Rate Risk Exposure (long term) 0.01 0.11
Exchange Rate Risk Exposure 0.01 0.56
Total Risk Exposure 0.03 0.01
Unsystematic Risk Exposure 0.02 0.01
Lending Structure (hypothesis variables)
Ratio of Real Estate Sector to total loan RE 0.30 0.10
Ratio of Broad Property Sector to total loan BPS 0.39 0.08
Ratio of Risky Sector to total loan RISKY 0.50 0.10
Change of Lending Composition LCC 0.87 0.11
Degree of Specialization of Lending SPEC 0.16 0.06
Variance of Traditionality Index VART 0.02 0.01
Credit related Variables
Ratio of Total Loans to Total Asset TL 0.52 0.25
Ratio of Provision of Loan Loss to Total Asset PLL 0.01 0.01
Capital Related Variables
Ratio of Total Equity to Total Asset TE 0.09 0.04
Interest Rate Related Variables
Ratio of Gap to Total asset GAP -0.17 0.19
Ratio of Interest Expense to Total asset INTEXP 0.03 0.01
Liquidity Related Variable
Ratio of Short Term Investment to Total Asset INV 0.14 0.12
Business Operation Related Variables
FIGURE 1. Trend of lending structure and CAPM risk exposures
a) The real estate lending. b) Change in lending composition
c) Degree of specialization of lending d) Variance of traditionality index
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For the total and unsystematic risk exposure, both
exhibit a similar trend. Corresponding to the boom in
economy, they show a low degree of risk exposures prior
to 1996. Similarly, at the peak of the financial crisis, the
total and unsystematic risk exposure hit their highest
points in 1998. Consequently, as the government and
market players imposed prudent risk management policies,
both began to show a decreasing trend.
Before proceeding to a regression analysis, a
correlation matrix test is conducted in ensuring that the
BSV are not severely correlated. As the correlation matrix
in Table 5 shows lower values than 0.8, we consider the
BSV are not seriously correlated, indicating that analysing
them simultaneously does not produce a multicollinearity
problem. Gujarati (2003) set a cut of point of 0.8 for the
correlation coefficient matrix. Values higher than 0.8
indicates that the variables are strongly correlated; thus,
should be analysed separately to avoid a multicollinearity
issue. For the regression results, fixed effect model appears
to be the best model for all types of the CAPM risk
exposures. The results for ‘none effect’ model, random
effect model, the Likelihood ratio test, and the Hausman
test will be provided upon request. Table 6(a)-(e) present
the fixed effect estimations for market, interest rate,
exchange rate, total and unsystematic risk exposure.
As for the case of market risk exposure, Table 6(a)
shows that real estate lending (BPS, RE, RISKY) as well as
specialization index (SPEC) are not significant; whilst
short-term lending portfolio stability (LCC) and medium-
term lending portfolio stability (VART) indicate positive
associations. The finding for real estate lending is
consistent with Nor Hayati and M. Ariff (2004), but the
finding for SPEC does not support Hassan (1993). Our
finding infers that both increasing real estate lending and
specialisation does not significantly jeopardise market
risk exposure. The positive association of LCC implies
that the short-run stability of lending portfolio increases
market risk exposure. Even though real estate lending
does not significantly influence market risk exposure, it
should be noted that a large number of non-performing
loan in the BPS may aggravate the market risk exposure to
an extent perhaps not fully reflected in the regression
g) Long-term interest rate risk h) Exchange rate risk
i) Total risk exposure j) Unsystematic risk exposure
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TABLE 5. Correlation matrix of independent variables
 BPS RE RISKY LCC SPEC VART TL PLL TE GAP INTEXP INV LTA NONII MGT
BPS 1
RE 0.82 1
RISKY 0.87 0.82 1
LCC 0.19 0.19 0.12 1
SPEC 0.18 -0.11 -0.09 -0.10 1
VART 0.18 0.08 -0.01 0.15 0.14 1
TL -0.04 -0.10 0.05 0.05 -0.39 0.02 1
PLL -0.09 -0.18 -0.04 -0.02 -0.30 -0.05 0.50 1
TE 0.43 0.43 0.43 0.13 0.07 0.07 -0.08 -0.12 1
GAP 0.03 -0.16 0.03 -0.36 0.09 0.18 0.02 0.13 0.014 1
INTEXP -0.15 -0.30 -0.01 -0.14 -0.17 -0.25 0.32 0.54 -0.15 0.23 1
INV 0.02 -0.12 0.02 0.08 -0.21 -0.16 0.31 0.23 -0.27 -0.26 0.23 1
LTA -0.30 0.12 -0.30 0.10 -0.37 0.10 -0.28 -0.19 -0.17 -0.32 -0.44 -0.06 1
NONII -0.06 -0.07 -0.11 -0.41 0.55 -0.19 -0.34 -0.31 0.07 0.13 -0.18 -0.26 -0.13 1
MGT -0.02 -0.32 -0.09 0.14 0.32 -0.00 0.389851 0.189109 -0.05207 -0.18425 0.249249 0.214558 -0.4567 0.175105 1
Notes: 1. Correlation Matrix is based on common sample
2. BPS, RE, RISKY, LCC, SPEC, and VART are the alternate measures of lending structure variables.
TABLE 6(a). Results for market risk exposure
Independent Expected
variables Coefficient sign Model 1(a) Model 1(b) Model 1(c) Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
0.34 0.59 0.40 -0.59 0.33 0.99
Constant (0.37) (0.73) (0.43) (-0.73) (0.31) (1.26)
0.16
BPS (0.55)
0.33
RE (1.13)
-0.04
RISKY (-0.12)
0.46**
LCC (2.54)
-0.08
SPEC (-0.16)
4.61*
VART (0.79)
0.58** 0.52* 0.59** 0.84* 0.58** -0.31
TL + (2.20) (1.92) (2.22) (1.84) (2.21) (-0.91)
0.43 0.05 0.91 0.83 0.57 6.07
PLL + (0.23) (0.03) (0.41) (0.42) (0.32) (1.39)
-0.14 -0.32 -0.02 -0.07 -0.05 -0.75*
TE - (-0.41) (-0.94) (-0.06) (-0.20) (-0.16) (-1.84)
0.28 0.27 0.28 0.33 0.29 -0.26
GAP + (1.22) (1.26) (1.09) (1.13) (1.13) (-0.95)
1.69 1.20 1.33 3.27* 1.43 -1.56
INTEXP + (0.94) (1.12) (0.73) (1.94) (0.81) (-0.70)
-0.35 -0.39 -0.31 -0.67* -0.32 -1.08***
INV - (-1.19) (-1.34) (-0.93) (-1.73) (-1.21) (-3.71)
0.13 0.09 0.13 0.21 0.14 0.05
LTA +/- (0.94) (0.80) (0.95) (1.52) (0.82) (0.40)
NONII - 8.04 7.82 8.07 11.15* 8.10 5.38*
+/- (1.43) (1.43) (1.37) (2.36) (1.37) (1.75)
MGT (-4.04) (-4.10) (-3.93) (-3.87) (-4.08) (-0.09)
R-squared 0.81 0.82 0.81 0.86 0.80 0.86
Adj R-squared 0.77 0.78 0.77 0.82 0.76 0.81
S.E. of reg 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27
F-Statistic 13.00 13.27 12.98 13.28 12.70 10.99
Prob (F) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
D.W. statistics 2.09 2.09 2.09 2.08 2.09 2.30
Notes:
1. Market risk exposure = f(LS, BSV)
2. Four different models of lending structure are analysed. Model 1(a)-(c) test the real estate lending, model 2 tests the stability of lending
structure in short run, model 3 tests the specialization index and model 4 tests the stability of lending structure in medium term period.
3. White cross-section heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance matrix estimators are reported.
4. Figures in parentheses are t-statistics
5. ***, **, * denotes significant at 1 %, 5% and 10% confidence level, respectively.
6. All independent variables except LTA are deflated by total asset. LTA is the log of total asset.
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result. As in June 2009, the monthly aggregate data for
the Malaysian commercial banks shows that the highest
non-performing loan comes from the BPS, which is around
45.66% (NPL for BPS is RM14.8 million out of total NPL
RM32.4 million). (BNM statistical bulletin, August 2009).
Unfortunately, the data limitation at the firm-level makes
it impossible to test the non-performing loan of real estate
lending in this study.
With regards to VART, the positive relationship infers
that the medium-term instability of lending portfolio
increases market risk exposure. Macroeconomic
disturbances such as the increasing real estate price and
global recession may contribute to the disruptions in the
lending structure. To the extent that macroeconomic
disturbances induce divergent patterns of lending
structure with increasing financial liberalisation, the
Malaysian banking sector is vulnerable to macroeconomic
shock; hence, it should be more alert to the domestic and
external economic developments.
For the case of interest rate risk exposure, only long-
term interest rate risk model produces significant F-
statistics while the short-term interest rate risk fails the F-
Statistic test. This implies that the significant role of short
term interest rate in the two-factor CAPM as highlighted
by Stone (1974), Martin and Keown (1977), Lynge and
Zumwalt (1980), Flanerry and James (1984), Brooth and
Officer (1985), Saunders et al. (1990), and Konishi and
Yasuda (2004) does not hold for the case of commercial
banking sector in Malaysia. One reason for this
phenomenon can be that the fluctuation in the market
has fully captured the movements in short term interest
rates.  The result for long-term interest rate risk exposure
is shown in Table 6(b). Among the four lending structure
measurements, only LCC and VART show significant result.
TABLE 6(b). Results for long-term interest rate risk exposure
Independent Expected
variables Coefficient sign Model 1(a) Model 1(b) Model 1(c) Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
0.24 0.28 0.27 0.10 -0.26 -1.27
C (0.51) (0.52) (0.55) (0.22) (0.63)  (-0.96)
0.09
BPS (0.61)
0.18
RE (1.10)
0.07
RISKY (0.54)
0.14**
LCC (2.06)
-0.51
SPEC (0.00)
5.05***
VART (8.01)
-0.29 -0.31* -0.32* -0.31 -0.36 -0.20**
TL + (-1.55) (-1.79) (-1.66) (-1.46) (0.03) (-2.55)
-2.27* -2.31* -2.32* -2.05 -2.17 2.72**
PLL + (-1.68) (-1.67) (-1.70) (-1.42) (0.11) (2.40)
-0.39 -0.47 -0.42 -0.49* -0.35 -0.07
TE - (-1.31) (-1.33) (-1.44) (-1.85) (0.18) (-0.31)
0.06 0.05 0.07 0.03 0.01 -0.49***
GAP + (0.66) (0.49) (0.83) (0.34) (0.87) (-3.50)
2.95** 3.14** 2.81** 3.33* 3.44* 14.54***
INTEXP + (2.14) (2.44) (2.02) (1.92) (1.91) (5.49)
0.06 -0.04 0.09 -0.09 -0.10 -0.42
INV - (0.23) (-0.16) (0.35) (-0.36) (0.61) (-1.45)
0.06 0.05 0.05 0.07 0.1 0.32**
LTA +/- (1.16) (0.82) (1.04) (1.61) 5(0.01) (2.17)
1.26 1.25 1.12 1.88 1.11 5.63***
NONII - (0.68) (0.73) (0.62) (1.15) (0.42) (3.80)
+/- -0.65* -0.62* -0.62* -0.70* -0.66* -1.56***
MGT (-1.83) (-1.84) (-1.72) (-1.80) (-1.80) (-3.26)
R-squared 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.38 0.39 0.67
Adj. R-squared 0.15 0.16 0.16 0.18 0.19 0.41
S.E. of regression. 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.09 0.06
F-Statistic 1.77 1.80 1.83 1.91 2.00 2.59
Prob (F) 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.01
D.W. stats 1.96 1.95 2.00 2.15 2.05 2.43
Notes:
1. Long-term interest rate risk exposure = f(LS, BSV)
2. Four different models of lending structure are analysed. Model 1(a)-(c) test the real estate lending, model 2 tests the stability of lending
structure in short run, model 3 tests the specialization index and model 4 tests the stability of lending structure in medium term period.
3. White cross-section heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance matrix estimators are reported.
4. Figures in parentheses are t-statistics
5. ***, **, * denotes significant at 1 %, 5% and 10% confidence level, respectively
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The positive relationship of LCC shows that the increasing
stability of lending structure in the short-run increases
the long-term interest rate risk exposures. This implies
that when a bank abides by its current lending portfolio,
its long-term interest rate risk exposure increases. This
can be due to the fact that around 40% of loans are given
to BPS. (mean value for BPS in this study is 0.393711).
Property loans are long-term in nature. Thus, when banks
keep on giving loans to long-term borrowers, they are
vulnerable to long-term interest rate risk exposure as the
loans are either tied to a fixed rate or vulnerable to change
as compared to the short-term interest rates.
Correspondingly, the positive relationship of VART
implies that the increasing divergence of medium-term
lending stability increases the long-term interest rate risk
exposure. Thus, this suggests that banks are incapable
of effectively allocating their lending portfolio (especially
the long-term loan) with respect to long-term interest rate
fluctuations.
For the exchange rate risk exposure, the results in
Table 6(c) show that all lending structure models are
insignificant. This implies that the exchange rate risk
exposure is not significantly determined by the change in
real estate lending, lending specialisation, and lending
stability. Nonetheless, PLL, INV, LTA, and GAP are the
significant BSV that affect the exchange rate risk
exposure.
Similar to exchange rate risk exposure, all lending
structure models are not significant for the total risk
exposure (Table 6(d)). This implies that the lending
structure does not affect the overall risk exposure for the
Malaysian commercial banks. Meanwhile, TL, INTEXP,
and LTA are the significant BSV in determining the total
risk exposure.
TABLE 6(c). Results for exchange rate risk exposure
Independent Expected
variables Coefficient sign Model 1(a) Model 1(b) Model 1(c) Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
-3.91** -3.44** -3.63** -5.40** -3.63** -4.57
C (-2.50) (-2.22) (-2.44) (-2.60) (-2.36) (-1.60)
0.49
BPS (0.98)
0.33
RE (0.83)
0.03
Risky Sectors (0.10)
0.43
LCC (1.41)
-0.02
SPEC (-0.02)
-7.94
VART (-1.04)
-0.04 -0.07 -0.01 -1.11* -0.01 -1.63*
TL + (-0.09) (-0.16) (-0.02) (-1.91) (-0.01) (-1.69)
9.04* 9.29* 10.23** 12.89*** 10.29* 9.37*
PLL + (1.72) (1.79) (2.11) (2.48) (1.94) (1.76)
-1.54 -1.55 -1.35 -1.61 -1.34 -0.91
TE - (-1.55) (-1.54) (-1.44) (-1.63) (-1.51) (-0.98)
-0.73** -0.73** -0.75** -1.04** -0.75** -1.26*
GAP + (-2.03) (-1.99) (-2.03) (-2.25) (-2.02) (-1.91)
6.03* 5.45 4.92 3.48 4.89 1.88
INTEXP + (1.69) (1.53) (1.41) (0.62) (1.34) (0.65)
0.98* 1.02* 1.11* 1.06* 1.12* 1.29**
INV - (1.67) (1.81) (1.94) (1.88) (1.92) (2.13)
0.48** 0.43** 0.47** 0.66*** 0.47** 0.43*
LTA +/- (2.63) (2.20) (2.61) (3.14) (2.52) (1.92)
0.53 0.05 0.37 0.34 0.36 -6.83
NONII - (0.07) (0.01) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (-0.95)
0.07 0.12 0.05 0.90 0.04 3.06
MGT +/- (0.07) (0.13) (0.05) (0.82) (0.04) (1.41)
R-squared 0.28 0.27 0.27 0.37 0.27 0.57
Adj R-squared 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.22 0.11 0.39
S.E. reg. 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.50 0.49 0.55
F Stats 1.76 1.68 1.71 2.40 1.71 3.24
Prob (F) 0.03 0.05 0.04 0.00 0.04 0.00
D.W statistics 2.59 2.61 2.61 2.46 2.61 2.62
Notes:
1. Exchange rate risk exposure = f(LS,BSV)
2. Four different models of lending structure are analysed. Model 1(a)-(c) test the real estate lending, model 2 tests the stability of lending
structure in short run, model 3 tests the specialization index and model 4 tests the stability of lending structure in medium term period.
3. White cross-section heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance matrix estimators are reported.
4. Figures in parentheses are t-statistics.
5. ***, **, * denotes significant at 1 %, 5% and 10% confidence level, respectively
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With respect to the unsystematic risk exposure, VART
is the only significant lending structure model as shown
in Table 6(e). (Recall that a high value of VART indicate
instability of lending structure). The inverse relationship
of VART infers that the medium-term instability of lending
structure reduces the unsystematic risk exposure. It
implies that if a bank responds to the development of the
economy by changing its lending structure, its ability to
grab the business opportunities reduces its unsystematic
risk (risk that is unique to individual banks, not to the
whole banking industry).
CONCLUSION
In general, our findings indicate that lending structure to
some extent affects the market, interest rate, and
unsystematic risk exposure. For the market risk exposure,
the stability of lending structure both in the short and
medium-term period have significant impact in determining
the market risk behavior of the Malaysian banks.
Meanwhile, short-term lending structure stability is
significant for long-term interest rate risk exposure and
medium-term lending structure stability is significant for
the unsystematic risk exposure. Out of the four lending
structure models, it can be inferred that the stability factor
of lending structure plays a significant role as opposed
to real estate lending and lending concentration. Thus,
the policy makers as well as regulatory bodies should be
aware of the significant role of effective lending strategy
as their decision to enforce policies, incentives, and
guidelines on certain sectors may affect various types of
bank risk exposures. Also, by knowing the impact of
lending structure on various types of risk exposures,
TABLE 6(d). Results for total risk exposure
Independent Expected
variables Coefficient sign Model 1(a) Model 1(b) Model 1(c) Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
0.08 0.09* 0.09 0.13*** 0.09 0.03
C (1.48) (1.67) (1.59) (4.41) (1.51) (0.50)
0.01
BPS (0.74)
0.01
RE (0.85)
-0.00
Risky Sectors (-0.20)
0.001
LCC (0.07)
0.01
SPEC (0.10)
-0.14
VART (-1.62)
0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.02 0.03*** -0.01
TL + (3.01) (2.91) (3.11) (1.25) (3.01) (-1.28)
-0.07 -0.07 -0.07 -0.001 -0.07 -0.17
PLL + (-1.01) (-1.01) (-0.88) (-0.05) (-0.91) (-1.01)
0.00 0.00 0.01 0.001 0.01 0.001
TE - (0.17) (0.02) (0.47) (0.11) (0.29) (0.16)
-0.01** -0.01* -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
GAP + (-2.07) (-1.94) (-1.66) (-0.84) (-1.49) (-1.05)
0.74*** 0.74*** 0.73*** 0.63*** 0.73*** 0.62***
INTEXP + (4.34) (4.41) (4.23) (6.27) (4.42) (4.69)
-0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.032*** -0.01 -0.03***
INV - (-1.30) (-1.32) (-1.07) (-3.72) (-1.25) (-3.55)
-0.01** -0.01** -0.01** -0.02*** -0.01* -0.01
LTA +/- (-2.10) (-2.25) (-2.08) (-4.18) (-1.86) (-0.60)
-0.09 -0.10 -0.10 0.062 -0.10 -0.13
NONII - (-0.55) (-0.59) (-0.61) (0.50) (-0.63) (-1.02)
0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.03
MGT +/- (0.38) (0.44) (0.27) (-0.37) (0.28) (1.28)
R-squared 0.84 0.84 0.84 0.90 0.84 0.94
Adj. R-Squared 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.87 0.80 0.91
S.E. of regression. 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01
F Stats 20.21 20.58 21.2 19.53 20.45 21.03
Prob (F) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
D.W. statistics 1.78 1.78 1.77 1.85 1.77 2.36
Notes:
1. Total risk exposure = f (LS, BSV)
2. Four different models of lending structure are analysed. Model 1(a)-(c) test the real estate lending, model 2 tests the stability of lending
structure in short run, model 3 tests the specialization index and model 4 tests the stability of lending structure in medium term period.
3. White cross-section heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance matrix estimators are reported.
4. Figures in parentheses are t-statistics.
5. ***, **, * denotes significant at 1 %, 5% and 10% confidence level, respectively
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bankers and investors can anticipate the degree of risk
exposures that they are willing to undertake, thus helping
them make accurate decisions. Last but not least, it is
worthy to mention that lending structure may not only
affect risk exposures, but it may also affect a bank’s
profitability, capital structure decision, and the degree of
risk tolerance. Moreover, it may also influence the overall
economic performance. Hence, when a bank is
strategising its lending structure while focusing only on
the risk aspect, it is not done in isolation. Instead, it
involves a complicated process relating to profitability,
capital structure, economic growth, etc. Therefore, studies
on the relationship between the lending structure and
the potential interactions of those variables can be an
interesting avenue for future research.
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